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Negative equityA mortgage holder whose property is worth less than the repayment value of the mortgage
may decide to strategically default, i.e., renege on the cash flow liability of the
mortgage loan and surrender the property to the mortgage issuer. In other circumstances
a mortgage holder may default due to personal income decline which makes payment
infeasible (unaffordability default) or for a combination of strategic and affordability
causes (dual-trigger default). This paper utilizes a database of troubled Irish mortgages
to model the default decisions of Irish mortgage holders. We include both affordability-
related and strategic-related explanatory variables. We find that both types of explanatory
variables play a role in the explosive growth in Irish mortgage default after the Irish
banking crisis and temporary legal prohibition of property repossession. We find that a
dual-trigger model of default best fits the Irish data. Given the unusual features of the Irish
market, our findings both complement and strengthen existing empirical findings from
other national mortgage markets.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.11. Introduction
During the period 2002–2012, Ireland experienced a
spectacular credit bubble and subsequent financial col-
lapse. This credit bubble and bust was roughly coincident
with the global credit–liquidity crisis, but was notably
extreme both in the exuberance of the upswing and sever-ity of the crash. Following the collapse of the Irish credit
bubble, Irish residential property prices fell sharply and
mortgage arrears grew explosively. From the peak in the
second quarter of 2007, residential property prices fell
50.3% to the trough in the second quarter of 2012, subse-
quently recovering 1.2% by the second quarter of 2013.
The number of home mortgages in default (greater than
90 days of accumulated arrears) grew by a truly spectacular
272.6%, from 26,271 in quarter three of 2009 to 97,874 in
quarter two of 2013; as of quarter two 2013, 12.7% of home
loan mortgages were in default. Aggregate data on buy-to-
let defaults is only available for a short period so the growth
path is not known, but 20.4% of buy-to-let mortgages were
in default as of quarter two of 2013.
In addition to the large credit bubble and bust, the Irish
mortgage market had unusual institutional features during
this period. Most existing Irish residential mortgages are
contractually written to be full recourse and with unhin-
dered security against the property. However, following
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and regulatory changes that altered the de facto nature of
mortgage claims. In July 2009, near the beginning of the cri-
sis, the Irish government passed a new lawwhich contained
a legal error (called a ‘‘lacuna’’) which rendered virtually all
mortgage property repossessions impossible until the
lacunawas fixed. This outcomewas not the stated intention
of the law, but the legal lacunawas politically convenient at
the time, and was not corrected via amending legislation
until May 2013. Also in response to the crisis, in February
2010 the Irish Central Bank implemented regulations
severely restricting the ability of banks to contact or harass
delinquentborrowers; these restrictionswere subsequently
relaxed in July 2013. Formost of our sample, Irish residential
mortgages were, in practice, limited-recourse contracts
with strictly limited security against the property asset,
and potentially very high transactions costs for the mort-
gage lender in eventually exercising the security claim.
The unusual economic and institutional environment in
Ireland over this recent period makes an examination of
property mortgage default behavior of considerable inter-
est. Ireland during this period provides a natural experi-
ment regarding the effects on mortgage holder behavior
of a very sharp fall in property prices and a concurrent block
on property repossessions. We use a data set of distressed
Irish mortgages to model Irish mortgage default behavior
during this period. We attempt to distinguish between
the three causal channels for mortgage default: strategic
default, unaffordability default, and dual-trigger default.
Strategic default canbeunderstoodusing options theory.
The owner of a residential property subject to a nonrecourse
mortgage who is willing to renege on his loan essentially
holds a put option against the market value of the property.
If the market price of the property falls sufficiently, the
owner can surrender the property to the mortgage lender
and in exchange receive full offset of his cash flow liability
from the mortgage loan. In options terminology, the home-
owner has a long-term American put option on a dividend-
paying asset (the implicit rental yield of the property serves
as the dividend flow) with exercise price equal to the cash-
equivalent value of themortgage liability. Themoneyness of
the put option is one minus the reciprocal of the loan-to-
value ratio of the mortgage; the put option has positive
moneyness if and only if the mortgage holder is in negative
equity (loan-to-value ratio greater than one). A similar, but
diluted, put optionality holds for recourse mortgages, since
there are legal and practical limits to a mortgage lender’s
recourse claim against the owner’s future income, for exam-
ple, relief from this claim through personal bankruptcy. In a
perfect-markets theory with no transactions costs nor any
other market imperfections, a mortgage holder will only
default on a full-recoursemortgage if there is both an inabil-
ity to pay and negative equity (otherwise the property can
be immediately sold to clear the debt). With a no-recourse
loan in this perfect-marketsworld, themortgage holderwill
default whenever there is negative equity (inability to pay
does not impact the decision).
Strategic default often involves reputational costs and
social/ethical considerations for the homeowner, since in
doing so the homeowner violates the terms of an agreed
contract for personal gain. In many cases, the mortgagelender will continue to receive (more valuable) required
mortgage payments even when options theory predicts
that it will be forced to accept surrender of the property.
Unlike strategic default, unaffordability default is
caused by a lack of personal income to pay the mortgage;
by definition, unaffordability default is not caused by the
options value of default. Dual-trigger default refers to a
mixed-caused case in which the mortgage holder has
stressed mortgage affordability but also is influenced by
the positive options-exercise value of default due to nega-
tive equity in the property.
In most situations, both the homeowner and mortgage
lender incur substantial transactions costs from reposses-
sion. This two-sided transactions-cost feature of the put
option leads to a bargaining game between the homeowner
and mortgage lender, with the homeowner potentially able
in some circumstances to gain mortgage payment conces-
sions by threatening to surrender the asset but not doing
so. The bargaining power of the mortgage borrower in
default seeking repayment concessions increases with the
moneyness of the put option. Stressed affordability can also
impact upon the bargaining power of the mortgage holder,
since the lender cannot easily distinguish between strained
affordability and true unaffordability. This bargaining game
aspect can explain dual-trigger default in which both the
strategic (options-exercise) value of default and stressed
affordability play an interactive role.
This paper empirically examines the causal variables
explaining the behavior of Irish mortgage defaulters. We
include both affordability-related and strategic-related
explanatory variables. We rely on a large database of Irish
mortgages provided to us by one of Ireland’s largest mort-
gage lenders, Permanent TSB. The database covers all mort-
gages at Permanent TSB for which the holder has
submitted a Standard Financial Statement (SFS), giving a
sample of 28,377 mortgage accounts. Submitting an SFS
is a required component of the Central Bank of Ireland’s
mandated mortgage arrears resolution process (MARP).
The entry of a mortgage borrower into MARP is either at
the initiation of the bank after one or more missed mort-
gage payments or, less commonly, by the mortgage bor-
rower looking to engage with the bank for help with
their mortgage payment difficulties. The sample is not rep-
resentative of all mortgages; it consists only of mortgages
which have been brought into MARP. The sample therefore
has two different sources of sample selection. One, the
sample does not include mortgages which have had no
income stress or payment difficulty and so justifiably are
not in MARP. Two, the sample does not include troubled
mortgages which should be in MARP but where the mort-
gage borrower has refused to submit the required SFS. Our
data consists of information from the SFS collated with
information from the original loan application and some
other loan-specific data items. Roughly half the mortgages
in our sample are in default, defined as greater than
90 days worth of accumulated payment arrears, and half
are performing loans. The dataset is a static, cross-sectional
sample (September 2013) but includes some historical
information for each mortgage as of that date.
Our main empirical task is to build a model explaining
which of this observed subset of all mortgages, i.e. the
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mitted an SFS, are in default, and which are not. We use a
combination of analysis of variance, multivariable probit
models and nonparametric and semiparametric kernel-
based estimators. We find that both strategic and afford-
ability variables play a role in explaining Irish mortgage
default behavior. Whereas in US data, unaffordability is
generally found to be more important than strategic
behavior as a predictor of default, within our Irish sample
the strategic motive appears to be equally or more impor-
tant than unaffordability. The loan-to-value ratio, which
measures the moneyness of the implicit put option, is the
most powerful variable in generating differences in aver-
age default rates across portfolios of loans double-sorted
by levels of explanatory variables. In a multivariate probit
model of mortgage default, loan-to-value is again the most
important explanatory variable, measured by marginal
contribution to the probability of default. The strategic
motive is particularly strong when combined with house-
hold income stress, supporting the dual trigger model of
mortgage default.
Using nonparametric and semiparametric methods, we
find some evidence for an options-type convexity in the
functional link of loan-to-value to mortgage default proba-
bility. This convex relationship also conforms to findings in
US-based research on the effect of loan-to-value on mort-
gage default rates.
Section 2 reviews the existing literature and critically
examines the insights which existing research can provide
regarding mortgage default behavior in Ireland. Section 3
describes ourmain econometricmodel ofmortgage default.
Section 4 empirically examines the default behavior of
mortgages in our database. Section 5 summarizes the paper.2. Default behavior of mortgage borrowers
There is a large literature modeling the default behavior
of mortgage borrowers. The empirical component of this
research is mostly based on US mortgage market data.
We will briefly review some of the papers with particular
relevance.
The original insight for modeling mortgage default as a
put option is credited to Asay (1978). Deng et al. (2000)
show empirically that a continuous-time, frictionless mar-
ket, Black–Scholes-type theory of mortgage default as put
option exercise provides useful empirical content, but is
not sufficient as an empirical model. Unlike the exercise
of a securities-market traded put option on a stock,
defaulting on a mortgage has large fixed costs, and a poten-
tially large impact on the future economic opportunities of
the mortgage borrower, particularly through its impact on
their personal credit rating and the availability of new
mortgage finance to them. Deng et al. also note that mort-
gage default is not fully ‘‘rational’’ in the sense of cash-flow
maximizing – there are moral/social/psychological aspects
to the default decision. Most of the recent literature does
not rely on the continuous-time, frictionless market
assumptions of Black–Scholes type models.
Elmer and Seelig (1999) build a model of mortgage
default which combines both the unaffordability motiveand strategic motive as causes of default. Using US data
aggregated at the state and regional level, they find that
both causes play a role in mortgage default, but that the
unaffordability motive is relatively stronger. The data used
in the paper pre-dates the volatile US property price
declines of the post-2007 period.
Using loan-level data, Tirupattur et al. (2010) conclude
that defaults driven by negative equity, rather than ability
to pay, are a significant phenomenon inUS residentialmort-
gages over their sample period. A borrower is defined as
strategically in default (that is, exercising their put option)
when their mortgage goes from current to 30-, 60- and then
90-days in arrears without any payment during this period
or any subsequent payments, while the borrower continues
to service non-mortgage loans. Strategic defaults increase
over time in concert with the decline in US residential prop-
erty prices and by the end of the sample (February 2010),
they represent 12% of all defaulted mortgages. Wyman
(2009) uses a similar approach and estimates that by the
second quarter of 2009, 19% of all defaults were strategic
rather than due to a lack of affordability.
Bhutta et al. (2010) build a theoretical model of mort-
gage borrower default decisions combining unaffordability
and strategic reasons for default. They test the model using
a loan-level database, combined with micro-regional prop-
erty price indices, covering several US states with large
property price declines (and business cycle recessions) in
the post-2007 period. They find that, considered sepa-
rately, income distress is the more important source of
default decisions, but that strategic default also plays a
prominent role at high loan-to-value ratios. They find that
when negative equity exceeds 50% of the property’s value,
half of the defaulters are exercising their put option rather
than experiencing any inability to pay. Also, Bhutta et al.
argue that their empirical findings support Foote’s (2008)
dual-trigger model of default – default is highest when
householders experience both simultaneous income falls
and negative equity increases. The two causes of default
interact and reinforce each other.
Bhutta et al. note that a contributory factor in strategic
default is the long ‘‘free-rent’’ period between original
default and repossession; this period lasts at least eight
to twelve months in most US states, dependent upon the
specific legal statutes of the state. The implicit cash value
of the free-rent period adds to the put payoff from default
and further incentivizes strategic default. Cutts and Merrill
(2008) look in detail at cross-state differences in the length
of the free-rent period associated with necessary legal
delays in the repossession process. They find that states
with relatively shorter periods have generally better out-
comes in terms of cure-rates (the proportion of households
with mortgages in arrears that get back on track and keep
their property). They estimate an ‘‘optimal’’ repossession
interval of 270 days from original missed payment to phys-
ical repossession, consisting of 150 days of customer coun-
seling/assistance with mortgage arrears, a default
declaration notice by the lender, and then 120 days before
physical repossession.
Relying on survey data, Guiso et al. (2009) find that
social considerations, such as morality and fairness, influ-
ence borrowers on the acceptability of strategically
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ing defaults are strategic. They find that almost no house-
holds will deliberately choose to default (given ability to
pay) if negative equity shortfall is less than 10% of the
value of the house; 17% of households will choose to
default even if they can afford to pay their mortgage when
negative equity reaches 50% of the value of the property.
Burke and Mihaly (2012), also based on survey data, find
that social perceptions about the acceptability of strategic
default, and financial literacy (the ability to navigate the
US bankruptcy system) influence household’s tendency
toward strategic default. Seiler et al. (2012) report that net-
works are an important determinant of strategic default:
borrowers who have family and friends in default are more
likely to strategically default themselves. Towe and Lawley
(2010) also find that social interactions play a significant
role in the decision to default, in that having a neighbor
in foreclosure increases the probability of default by 28%.
Elul et al. (2010) use an econometric framework some-
what similar to our own. They define default as accumu-
lated arrears of 60 days or more, and estimate a logit
model of binary default outcomes based on individual-
credit-record data, together with nationwide quarterly
interest rate data and quarterly US state-level unemploy-
ment rate changes. They find that both negative equity,
which they interpret as strategic default, and inability to
pay have a significant effect on mortgage default probabil-
ity. They also find that the two causes interact, so that
mortgage default rates are particularly high when negative
equity is combined with stressed ability to pay. Elul et al.
also explore the possibility of a nonlinear impact of nega-
tive equity on mortgage default rates and find some confir-
matory evidence.
We follow Elul et al. in interpreting the relationship
between negative equity and default as indicative of a stra-
tegic motive for default; this interpretation is also sup-
ported by survey evidence, e.g., Guiso et al. (2009). We
note however that there can also be some role for negative
equity as a causal factor in distressed default: an income-
distressed mortgage holder with positive equity has the
option to sell the property and completely erase the debt
whereas this option is not available to a mortgage holder
with negative equity.
Trautmann and Vlahu (2011) build a game-theoretic
model of borrower runs: the tendency of borrowers to
deliberately choose default when they perceive balance
sheet weakness at the lending bank. Borrowers know that
weak banks are likely to be less aggressive in quickly
repossessing property, and also that the long-term rela-
tionship of the borrower with the bank has less value if
the bank is weak. Since borrower loan nonpayments aggra-
vate the weakness of the bank’s balance sheet, borrower
runs can self-reinforce in the same way as bank depositor
runs.
The bargaining-game perspective of Trautmann and
Vlahu highlights an important bargaining-game benefit to
strategic default which increases as the moneyness of the
implicit put option increases. Mortgage borrowers are
aware that the lending bank must pay a large transactions
cost in repossessing a property, and that the bank would
benefit if it could negotiate reduced-value payment termsrather than repossess a negative-equity property. If the
bank does not have full recourse to all the borrower’s
future income, then negative equity in the loan creates a
gap between the present value of full mortgage payments
and the present value of the minimummortgage payments
that the bank will hypothetically accept to avoid costly
repossession. Strategic default (particularly in Ireland
where repossession is very costly and difficult for banks)
can be employed as a credible threat in negotiations for
improved payment terms. Given the structure of Irish
mortgage contracts (limited recourse, very costly reposses-
sion, banks with weak balance sheets) this is likely to be an
important consideration in the Irish case.
Lydon and McCarthy (2011) provide an analysis of Irish
mortgage market default based on data collected from four
Irish banks during the Central Bank of Ireland’s 2010 stress-
testing reviewof the domestic banking sector. Like Elul et al.
(2010) and this paper they use a static probitmodel ofmort-
gage default based on individual loan characteristics. They
argue that their static probit model results support a dual-
trigger model of default in which both unaffordability and
strategic motives (i.e. high loan-to-value ratios) impact
household mortgage default. They also find that the regio-
nal unemployment rate, as a proxy for local economic
shocks, has an impact on regional average default rates.
Using a dynamic model applied to regional loan portfolios
rather than individual loans, they can not confidently iden-
tify a strategic motive for default, but the effect is statisti-
cally significant for regional buy-to-let loan portfolios.
One obvious concern is the applicability of US-based
research for modeling the default behavior of Irish mort-
gage borrowers. There are important social, cultural, regu-
latory, and legal differences between U.S. and Irish
residential mortgage markets. The Irish legal and regula-
tory environment has not been constant over the our sam-
ple period. Starting with the 2009 Land Reform Act, which
contained a legal flaw rendering residential property
repossession virtually impossible in Ireland, there have
been a variety of changes to repossession, bankruptcy,
and personal insolvency laws and regulation. The legal
flaw in the 2009 Land Reform Act was eventually removed
after sustained pressure from Ireland’s international lend-
ers (the International Monetary Fund, European Central
Bank and European Union) under the sovereign bail-out
programme. From an international perspective, the current
Irish system is borrower-friendly and repossession is slow
and costly; see Mac Coille et al. (2013) for a review. Coin-
cidentally or otherwise, during the economically-turbulent
period in which these regulatory and legal changes to
mortgage contract enforcement were implemented, Irish
mortgage arrears grew explosively. Fig. 1 compares the
time-series patterns of Irish mortgage defaults, the unem-
ployment rate, per capita real income, and residential
property prices over the period Q4 2002 – Q2 2013; all
the macroeconomic series are normalized to 100 at the
starting date of mortgage default data availability, Q3
2009, while the default rate is plotted on the secondary
(right) vertical axis. The rapid increase in mortgage
defaults occurs alongside a prolonged period of rising
unemployment, falling house prices and falling or stagnant
real income.
Fig. 1. Comparative time series of Irish residential property price index, unemployment rate, Per-capital real income and home loan default rate.
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probit models of mortgage default
3.1. Linear index probit: a brief review
Our main econometric model is a linear-index probit
model of default. We assume that for each mortgage, the
borrower’s default outcome is based on an unobserved
(by the econometrician) decision index v i; if v i > 0 then
the mortgage holder defaults. Each borrower’s decision
index is a linear combination of a k – vector of explanatory
variables xi with linear coefficients b plus an unobservable
individual-specific random component ei capturing
default-relevant idiosyncratic effects:
v i ¼ b0 þ b0xi þ ei ð1Þ
and we assume that ei has a standard normal distribution
and is independent across mortgage borrowers. Let di
denote the observable binary variable which is 1 if the bor-
rower has defaulted and 0 otherwise. Let UðÞ denote the
cumulative probability function of a standard normal var-
iate. Given observation of fdi; xigi¼1;...;n maximum likelihood
estimation of ðb0; bÞ is straightforward:
ðb0; bÞ ¼ argmax
ðb0 ;bÞ
1
n
Xn
i¼1
di logðUðb0 þ b0xiÞÞ þ ð1 diÞ
 logð1Uðb0 þ b0xiÞÞ ð2Þ
which is easily solved by nonlinear maximization and gives
consistent, asymptotically normal estimates with consis-
tently-estimated standard errors, see, e.g., Greene (2008).
In practice, mortgage holders face an intertemporally
linked series of choices, each month choosing either to
overpay, fully pay, partially pay, or not pay their monthly
mortgage payment due. The mortgage holder is in default,
under our definition, when the accumulated balance of
unpaid arrears is greater than or equal to three times the
current required monthly payment. We follow a fairly
common research strategy and simplify this intertemporalchoice problem by modeling it as a static default/nonde-
fault choice. Specifying and estimating a dynamic inter-
temporal model of each monthly payment decision
would greatly complicate the analysis and is not empiri-
cally feasible with our limited dataset.
Readers who are not interested in the econometric
technicalities required to allow nonlinearity in the decision
index (1) may wish to skip ahead to the next section, which
presents the empirical findings.3.2. Nonparametric estimation of the link between loan-to-
value and default
A potential weakness of standard probit, in our applica-
tion, is the assumption of a linear decision index (1).
Options pricing theory predicts that the put-option compo-
nent of the value of default depends nonlinearly upon the
loan-to-value ratio. The exact nonlinear shape is not possi-
ble to derive due to the complexity of the embedded put
option. The put-option-based value of default is near zero
for loan-to-value below one and then slopes positively.
There is corresponding empirical evidence from US
research that strategic mortgage default is nonlinear in
the loan-to-value ratio, which again argues against the lin-
earity assumption in the decision index.
In this subsection we analyze a probit model with a
fully nonparametric decision index. This model is theoret-
ically estimable by maximum likelihood, see Matzkin
(1992), but it is not feasible in our application due to the
curse of dimensionality (we have six explanatory vari-
ables). Nonetheless we can use the general model to esti-
mate the conditional expected rate of default as a
function of loan-to-value. This conditional expectation
function is estimable, and can be compared to the pre-
dicted conditional expectation function implied by the lin-
ear-index probit model. Comparison of the two estimates
of this conditional expectation function provides the basis
for a nonparametric test of index-linearity of the probit
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against a general nonparametric alternative without being
able to completely estimate the nonparametric alternative.
We replace the linear decision index with a nonlinear
generalization:
v i ¼ f ðxiÞ þ ei ð3Þ
where f ðÞ is a thrice continuously differentiable multivar-
iate function. We continue to assume that ei has a standard
normal distribution and is independent across i. We
assume that for each i the vector of explanatory variables
xi is a realization from a multivariate joint distribution,
independent of ei:
xi  D;
with the restrictions on D described later. Let the first com-
ponent of xi, that is x1i, be the loan-to-value ratio. Note that
conditional upon a realized value of xi and given knowl-
edge of f ðÞ, the probability distribution for di has the same
form as in the case of the linear-index probit:
Prðdi ¼ 1Þ ¼ Uðf ðxiÞÞ;
recall that UðÞ denotes the cumulative normal probability
function. Since di is a binomial zero–one this implies:
E½dijxi ¼ Uðf ðxiÞÞ:
Recall that we assume that f ðÞ is a smooth multivariate
function. We require that the joint density of the explana-
tory variables, D, is sufficiently smooth so that the follow-
ing conditional expectation is well-defined and thrice
continuously differentiable in x1i:
gðx1iÞ ¼ E½E½dijxijx1i ¼ E½Uðf ðxiÞÞjx1i: ð4Þ
Nonparametric regression provides a natural method
for estimating gðx1iÞ based on the conditional moment
expression (4). In large samples, the conditional expected
default at a particular point x1i is consistently estimated
by the local-weighted average default in the neighborhood
of x1i:
p lim
n!1
1
Sn
Xn
j¼1
djjðx1j; x1iÞ ¼ gðx1iÞ ð5Þ
where jðx1j; x1iÞ ¼ densðx1jx1ihn Þ for some density function
densðÞ and bandwidth hn, and sum of weights
Sn ¼
Pn
j¼1djjðx1j; x1iÞ. See the Technical Appendix for condi-
tions guaranteeing the consistency and asymptotic nor-
mality of the estimator (5).
Note that this fully nonparametric model encompasses
the linear-index probit model as a special case. This allows
us to test the linear decision index against a fully nonlinear
alternative without maximum likelihood estimation of (3).
First estimating the linear index probit model by maxi-
mum likelihood (2), we then use the same kernel regres-
sion to estimate the conditional expectation function
using the estimated linear index probit model. Any differ-
ence between these two nonparametric estimates of the
conditional expectations function captures a linear model
bias of the probit model. Under the joint assumptions of
this subsection and of the probit model in Section 3.1
above:p lim
n!1
1
Sn
X
Uðbb0 þ bb0xjÞjðx1j; x1iÞ ¼ gðx1iÞ ð6Þ
where the kernel regression terms are identical to (5)
above. See the Technical Appendix for conditions guaran-
teeing consistency of the estimator (6). The difference
between the unrestricted (5) and restricted (6) estimates
of gðx1iÞ we call the linear model bias.
3.3. Partially linear index probit: a brief review
There are a number of semiparametric extensions of the
standard linear probit model, designed to add flexibility to
the functional form without unduly sacrificing estimation
accuracy. The partially linear index probit model is a par-
ticularly appropriate model choice in our application. It
sacrifices some of the flexibility of the fully nonparametric
model discussed in the last subsection, by imposing linear-
ity on all but one of the explanatory variables. The decision
index is assumed to take the following additive semipara-
metric form:
v i ¼ f ðx1iÞ þ b0ð1Þxð1Þi þ ei ð7Þ
where xð1Þi is a ðk 1Þ – vector of the explanatory variables
excluding the loan-to-value ratio x1i and bð1Þ is a
ðk 1Þvector of associated linear coefficients. The univar-
iate function f ðx1iÞ is assumed to be thrice continuously
differentiable, and ei is standard normal. The intercept b0
is not included in the model since it is not identifiably sep-
arable from f ðx1iÞ.
We follow the estimation algorithm proposed by Carroll
et al. (1997). To get initial values, the linear-index probit
model (1) is estimated by maximum likelihood (2). Then
for a grid point x1i a local quasi-maximum likelihood prob-
lem is solved for scalar estimate bf x1i :
bf x1i ¼ argmax 1SnX
n
i¼1
jðx1i; x1iÞfdi logðUðbf x1i þ bb0 ð1Þxð1ÞiÞÞ
þ ð1 diÞ logð1Uðbf x1i þ bb0 ð1Þxð1ÞiÞÞg ð8Þ
where jðx1i; x1iÞ is a kernel-weighting scheme and Sn is the
sum of the kernel weights. This local quasi-maximum like-
lihood problem is solved for each of a set of finely spaced
grid points covering the sample range of x1i. A cross-sec-
tion of implied estimates for f ðx1iÞ is found by interpolating
between grid points:
bf ðx1iÞ ¼ bf x1i þ ðx1i  x1iÞðbf x1i  bf x1i Þ ð9Þ
where x1i > x1i are the two contiguous grid points contain-
ing x1i. Next, we return to the linear-index probit maxi-
mum likelihood problem but replacing b0 þ b1x1i with the
pre-estimated bf ðx1iÞ from (9):
bbð1Þ ¼ argmax
bð1Þ
1
n
Xn
i¼1
di logðUðbf ðx1iÞ þ b0ð1Þxð1ÞiÞÞ
þ ð1 diÞ logð1Uðbf ðx1iÞ þ b0ð1Þxð1ÞiÞÞ: ð10Þ
The two steps (8) and (10) are iterated to convergence. See
Carroll et al. (1997) and Bellemare et al. (2002) for discus-
sion of convergence properties, optimal bandwidth choice,
Table 1
Percentage distributions of loan type and default rates.
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section.All loans
(%)
Home
loans (%)
Buy-to-let
loans (%)
All loans 100 88.9 11.1
% Loans in default in the
category
48.8 48.7 49.94. Empirical analysis of Irish mortgage defaults
4.1. The database and key variables
Our database was provided by Permanent TSB bank and
consists of all property loans at Permanent TSB in Septem-
ber 2013 that have submitted a Standard Financial State-
ment (SFS). The bank collates the information in the SFS
with existing bank information on the loan account,
including application information and payment records.
The Central Bank of Ireland mandates that all mortgage
lenders must collect an SFS from each home loan mortgage
borrower in arrears, as part of the Mortgage Arrears Reso-
lution Process (MARP). MARP is the Central Bank mandated
process that all regulated mortgage lenders must follow in
dealing with customer mortgage payment difficulties. Each
regulated mortgage lender must treat every mortgage loan
which has been in arrears (for any amount) for more than
31 calendar days as in MARP, and must write to the mort-
gage borrower within 3 business days after these 31 days
are elapsed and tell them that they are covered by MARP.
The lender must provide an SFS to the borrower in MARP,
give them assistance in filling out the SFS as needed, and
then must pass the completed SFS to the Arrears Support
Unit within the lending bank which must follow specific
regulations in dealing with each MARP case. If the mort-
gage borrower fails to return the SFS then they can be clas-
sified under Central Bank of Ireland regulations as a
noncooperative borrower and borrower protections under
MARP may be lifted. Mortgage borrowers may also volun-
tarily submit an SFS, for example in order to negotiate
mortgage restructuring without falling into arrears.
SFS coverage encompasses, at least in theory, any mort-
gage borrower who misses any part of a mortgage pay-
ment, as long as the missed payment is not rectified
within 31 days. It also encompasses all borrowers negotiat-
ing for mortgage payment alterations. Ireland does not yet
have a national credit register database, and under Euro-
pean data rules Irish banks are restricted in the informa-
tion that they can keep regarding the current financial
situation of existing borrowers (other than information
received at loan origination). The SFS database allows us
to link the current financial situation of borrowers with
their mortgage application data and mortgage payment
histories. The database is limited in some ways as we dis-
cuss below, but it still provides valuable insight into mort-
gage default behavior during a tumultuous period in Irish
financial history.
There are a total of 28,377 loan accounts in the data-
base, 25,235 home loan accounts and 3,142 residential
property investor loan accounts (called buy-to-let loans).
Mortgage borrowers with both home and buy-to-let loans
are included in the buy-to-let loans figure. For each multi-
ple-loan account we aggregate the individual loan charac-
teristics and effectively treat it as one loan observation.
Taking account of borrowers with multiple loans the
database covers 37,547 individual home loans and 4,285individual buy-to-let loans; this compares to a total out-
standing portfolio of 140,060 home loans and 23,133
buy-to-let loans at Permanent TSB, so 23.7% of the bank’s
total home loans portfolio are in the database and 18.5%
of its buy-to-let loans portfolio. The database includes a
default dummy for any loan that has accumulated arrears
of greater than 90 days. A multiple account is treated as
in default if accumulated arrears on any of the loans is
greater than 90 days of required payments. Table 1 shows
the percentages of the two loan types in default in the
database. In the Permanent TSB total loan book, 15.3% of
home loans and 17.9% of buy-to-let loans are in default;
this of course differs sharply from our database (SFS-linked
loans only) with 48.7% of home loans and 49.9% of buy-to-
let loans in default.
The default dummy signifies whether the mortgage
account has greater than 90 days arrears on the database
sampling date, which is September 2013. The database also
includes the month in which the SFS was submitted and
whether or not the mortgage account was in default on
the SFS submission date. Fig. 2 shows the SFS submission
numbers each month from the initiation of MARP until
September 2013. Most of the SFS were submitted during
the second half of the period. Fig. 3 display the patterns
of default as a function of the SFS submission date. Mort-
gage accounts from an SFS submitted in the earlier months
have lower initial default rates (that is, fewer are in default
on their SFS date), but a higher proportion enter default
between their SFS date and September 2013 which is the
date used to measure default in our empirical analysis.
For all SFS submission months, only a small proportion of
mortgages exit default between their SFS submission
month and September 2013. The net effect of these offset-
ting trends leaves the proportion of mortgages in default in
September 2013 with a moderate, generally upward, trend
as a function of their SFS submission date.
In addition to the default dummy, the database has the
‘‘number of days’’ of accumulated arrears (30  arrears
amount/monthly required payment) as of September
2013. Table 2 summarizes this data. This measure has
the advantage over the default dummy that it captures
the level of accumulated arrears rather than only giving a
binary indicator of default. However, the range of values
runs very high – half of the mortgages in arrears have
almost a year (314 days) of accumulated arrears. The dif-
ference between a loan that is five years in arrears and a
loan which is one year in arrears seems mostly a matter
of timing for when the default began, rather than a differ-
ent decision by the mortgage borrower. Also, there is
extant research literature on mortgage loan default but
no comparable non-Irish data or research on multi-year
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Fig. 2. Number of SFS submitted by month.
Fig. 3. Default patterns by SFS submission month.
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loan default rather than accumulated arrears.2
There are two sources of sample selection in our data-
base, both of which limit the general applicability of our
empirical analysis. First, we only have information on
mortgages for which there is an SFS on file at the bank.
In the absence of an SFS, there is no current information
available for the borrower. Completely non-distressed
mortgages do not appear in our database, and so we do2 We also considered modeling the ‘‘cures’’ (i.e. mortgages in default on
the SFS date that are performing by end of sample) but our sample covers a
period with very few reliably–identifiable, successful cures. Greater detail
is given in the unpublished appendix, Connor and Flavin (2014).not model their holders’ decision-making in choosing
non-default.
The second source of sample selection comes from
imperfect compliance with the Central Bank of Ireland
requirement for an SFS for each troubled mortgage. It is
not possible from the database to compute the compliance
rate for all mortgage types since SFS submissions can be
required by the bank or voluntarily chosen by the mort-
gage borrower. One exception is home mortgages in
default, where submission of an SFS is mandated in all
cases by MARP. Permanent TSB records 21,398 home loan
accounts in default, but have only 14,996 SFS submissions
from home loan mortgage borrowers in default, giving an
SFS submission compliance rate of 70.1% for this subcate-
gory. The potential statistical interaction between the
Table 2
Statistical distribution of days in arrears for loan accounts with nonzero
arrears.
All loans Home loans Buy-to-let loans
10% Fractile 34 34 40.6
25% Fractile 110 106 150
Median 314 305 423
Mean 451.8 443.8 516.8
75% Fractile 662 642 766.3
90% Fractile 1037 1034 1095
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and our model of their default decision (based only on data
for those who have complied) limits the applicability of our
results for mortgages outside the conditioning set. It seems
possible that non-cooperation is more tempting for bor-
rowers with certain characteristics, which may also impact
their default decision-making. In the econometrics litera-
ture this type of endogenous sample selection is called
self-selection, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chapter
16) for an overview. We can only offer the caveat that
our model is of borrower default outcomes conditional
upon their submitting an SFS, and is not dependable for
non-cooperating borrowers, who are outside this condi-
tioning set.
We rely on six explanatory variables for loan default.
Application LTV is the loan-to-value ratio at the time the
loan was issued (we also have the date of issue, which
we use in Table 3 below). LTV is the estimated current loan
to value ratio. The current loan-to-value ratio takes the
most recent physical valuation of the property available
to the bank (for the majority of loans this will be the valu-
ation done at the application date, but it may be more
recent) and then uses a property price index to adjust for-
ward the valuation to account for price increases and/or
decreases since the physical valuation date. The forward
price adjustment uses the most relevant of the following
four property price indices for each individual property:
Dublin houses, Dublin apartments, non-Dublin houses,
and non-Dublin apartments. The loan amount is adjustedTable 3
Data distribution of each explanatory variable across years of loan origination.
Year Application payment-to-
income ratio (%)
Application loan-to-
value ratio (%)
App
inco
1999 or
earlier
5.27 3.72 3.0
2000 2.55 2.55 2.1
2001 2.75 2.74 2.3
2002 3.65 3.65 3.2
2003 5.98 5.98 5.8
2004 8.76 8.76 8.7
2005 13.92 13.92 13.9
2006 21.30 21.30 21.2
2007 19.00 19.00 18.8
2008 13.22 13.22 12.8
2009 2.83 2.83 2.8
2010 0.53 0.53 0.5
2011 0.15 0.15 0.1
2012 0.07 0.07 0.0
2013 0.02 0.00 0.0
Missing 13.68 1.59 3.9
Truncated 0.11 0.02 0.0for amortization or reverse-amortization of the capital bal-
ance using the bank’s payment records on the individual
loan.
The payment-to-income index, or affordability index for
short, is defined as required payment commitments
divided by net income. Net income is the after-tax income
of the borrower (or multiple borrowers). The definition of
required payment commitments differs between home
and buy-to-let loans:
Required payment commitments for home loans =
existing short term debt payments + existing mortgage
payments + existing buy-to-let deficit + maintenance costs
+ proposed buy-to-let deficit + proposed mortgage pay-
ments - tax relief.
Required payment commitments for buy-to-let loans =
existing short term debt payments + existing mortgage
payments + existing buy-to-let deficit + maintenance +
proposed buy-to-let deficit – tax relief.
The same formulas are used for the application values
and current values of the affordability index. The current
values are at the date on which the most recent SFS was
received, and use information provided by the household
on this form.
The loan-to-value ratios for a multiple-loan account are
computed as the sum of the multiple loan amounts divided
by the sum of the property values, both currently and at
the application date of the most recent loan. The afford-
ability ratio for a multiple-loan account sums the required
payment commitments from all the loans and then divides
by net income.
We examined the database for data outliers and other
discernible errors. The only notable problem we could
identify was that 0 had been used in some cases in place
of missing data. Since all six of our explanatory variables
should be strictly positive, except in most unusual circum-
stances, we treat all zero entries as missing. We truncated
application LTV and LTV at 5.0, and the affordability index
at 3.0, to dampen the influence of extreme values (which
may be data errors) on the estimation routines. Table 3lication net
me (%)
Payment-to-income
ratio (%)
Loan-to-value
ratio (%)
Net
income
(%)
8 5.27 5.27 5.15
7 2.55 2.55 2.48
9 2.75 2.75 2.68
2 3.65 3.65 3.58
9 5.98 5.98 5.84
5 8.76 8.76 8.61
2 13.92 13.92 13.67
9 21.30 21.30 20.90
8 19.00 19.00 18.58
7 13.22 13.22 13.00
2 2.83 2.83 2.77
2 0.53 0.53 0.52
5 0.15 0.15 0.15
6 0.07 0.07 0.07
0 0.02 0.02 0.02
8 2.02 0.00 2.02
0 2.45 0.41 0.00
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables.
Bottom quartile Median Top quartile Mean Standard deviation Number of observations
Application date loan-to-value .420 .640 .880 .631 .256 28,061
Current loan-to-value .620 1.02 1.42 1.04 .570 28,377
Application date payment-to-income .290 .340 .370 .336 .141 25,549
Current payment-to-income .280 .380 .540 .471 .351 27,879
Application date net income €2664 €3517 €4473 €3843 €3390 27,725
Current net income €1802 €2529 €3480 €2840 €1868 27,879
Table 5
Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables.
LTV Application date
LTV
Affordability Application date
affordability
Log
income
Application date log
income
LTV 1.000
Application date LTV 0.655 1.000
Affordability 0.113 0.039 1.000
Application date
affordability
0.081 0.020 0.109 1.000
Log income 0.076 0.012 0.556 0.073 1.000
Application date log income 0.123 0.096 0.014 0.012 0.164 1.000
Table 6
Default rates for loans doubly-sorted by loan-to-value, payment-to-income and net income: full sample.
Low payment-to-income (%) Moderate payment-to-income (%) High payment-to-income (%)
a:Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and affordability
Low LTV 43.43 39.04 46.03
Moderate LTV 41.55 43.98 57.34
High LTV 47.40 56.47 70.55
b:Default rates for loans sorted by loan-to-value and net income
High income (%) Moderate income (%) Low income (%)
Low LTV 31.91 40.26 48.85
Moderate LTV 39.11 47.40 56.63
High LTV 51.34 59.78 69.13
c:Default rates for loans sorted by affordability and net income
High income (%) Moderate income (%) Low income (%)
Low payment-to-income 38.40 42.02 51.39
Moderate payment-to-income 45.11 47.31 60.27
High payment-to-income 58.50 48.36 60.81
Table 7
Proportions of loans in default for subcategory of loan-to-value and increased/decreased affordability.
Loan type Change in affordability Low loan-to-value (%) Moderate loan-to-value (%) High loan-to-value (%)
Full sample Increased affordability 31.00 40.89 49.92
Decreased affordability 37.41 49.48 63.83
Home loans Increased affordability 31.09 41.49 50.72
Decreased affordability 37.72 49.18 63.56
Buy-to-let loans Increased affordability 28.07 33.03 41.63
Decreased affordability 33.33 51.16 65.93
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each year of loan origination, along with the number of
data points truncated. The columns in the table differ since
some variables have missing data, particularly for applica-
tion data at earlier loan origination dates. 67% of the mort-
gages in the database originate in the 4 years 2005–2008.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the six explana-
tory variables. Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of
the explanatory variables. Not surprisingly, application
LTV and LTV have a fairly strong cross-sectional correlationof 0.655. For most of the mortgage accounts in the sample,
the difference between these two variables predominantly
reflects capital gain or loss on the underlying property,
although loan amortization can also be a factor, particu-
larly for older mortgages.
4.2. Estimation of the model
As a preliminary step we double-sort all loans using
each pair of the three current variables: loan-to-value,
Table 8
Probit model of default with six explanatory variables.
Variable Coefficient Std error T-stat Significance
a: Full sample
App affordability 0.063 0.058 1.081 0.280
App LTV 0.617 0.043 14.261 0.000
App log income 0.016 0.011 1.471 0.141
Affordability 0.312 0.031 10.170 0.000
LTV 0.620 0.022 28.443 0.000
Log income 0.192 0.019 10.310 0.000
Constant 0.901 0.159 5.664 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.059
No. of observations 25116
b:Home loans
App affordability 0.078 0.066 1.184 0.236
App LTV 0.619 0.046 13.531 0.000
App log income 0.019 0.021 0.895 0.371
Affordability 0.225 0.043 5.274 0.000
LTV 0.628 0.023 26.865 0.000
Log income 0.207 0.026 7.965 0.000
Constant 1.024 0.197 5.200 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.054
No. of observations 22474
c:Buy-to-let loans
App affordability 0.043 0.135 0.318 0.75
App LTV 0.564 0.143 3.93 0
App log income 0.021 0.013 1.663 0.096
Affordability 0.551 0.068 8.132 0
LTV 0.578 0.063 9.135 0
Log income 0.205 0.048 4.222 0
Constant 0.772 0.438 1.763 0.078
Pseudo R-squared 0.115
No. of observations 2642
Table 9
Probit model of default with four explanatory variables.
Variable Coefficient Std error T-stat Significance Marginal probability
at average values
Average of pointwise
marginal probability
a:Full sample
App LTV 0.394 0.039 10.096 0.000 0.15694 0.2069
Affordability 0.227 0.027 8.312 0.000 0.09028 0.11901
LTV 0.452 0.019 23.857 0.000 0.18012 0.23744
Log income 0.237 0.017 14.331 0.000 0.09427 0.12427
Constant 1.484 0.136 10.932 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.044
No. of observations 27568
b:Home loans
App LTV 0.383 0.041 9.292 0.000 0.15243 0.19891
Affordability 0.093 0.036 2.565 0.010 0.03689 0.04814
LTV 0.458 0.020 22.585 0.000 0.18248 0.23813
Log income 0.275 0.021 13.239 0.000 0.10964 0.14307
Constant 1.825 0.170 10.725 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.039
No. of observations 24515
c:Buy-to-let loans
App LTV 0.425 0.131 3.247 0.001 0.16893 0.19999
Affordability 0.491 0.058 8.502 0.000 0.19534 0.23126
LTV 0.483 0.056 8.588 0.000 0.19204 0.22735
Log income 0.210 0.042 4.974 0.000 0.08373 0.09912
Constant 1.089 0.379 2.875 0.004 0.43316 0.5128
Pseudo R-squared 0.102
No. of observations 3053
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the average default rate within each subset. For each vari-
able the first breakpoint is the 25% fractile of its univariate
distribution and the second breakpoint is the 75% fractile,so that the middle category captures the interquartile
range. The interquartile range is (0.62,1.42) for loan-to-
value, (0.28,0.54) for payment-to-income, and (log(1,802),
log (3,480)) for log of net monthly income. The results
Table 10
Logit model of default with four explanatory variables.
Variable Coefficient Std
error
T-stat Significance
a:Full sample
App LTV 0.724 0.066 10.954 0.000
Affordability 0.361 0.046 7.875 0.000
LTV 0.797 0.034 23.335 0.000
Log income 0.406 0.027 14.922 0.000
Constant 2.572 0.223 11.545 0.000
Pseudo R-
squared
0.046
No. of
observations
27568
b:Home loans
App LTV 0.712 0.070 10.193 0.000
Affordability 0.125 0.060 2.085 0.037
LTV 0.811 0.037 22.069 0.000
Log income 0.467 0.034 13.703 0.000
Constant 3.123 0.279 11.211 0.000
Pseudo R-
squared
0.040
No. of
observations
24515
c:Buy-to-let loans
App LTV 0.738 0.217 3.393 0.001
Affordability 0.843 0.102 8.286 0.000
LTV 0.860 0.100 8.601 0.000
Log income 0.407 0.073 5.543 0.000
Constant 2.225 0.649 3.430 0.001
Pseudo R-
squared
0.106
No. of
observations
3053
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information about default rates. The strongest double-sort
comes from using loan-to-value and log income together,Fig. 4. Local proportion of loans in defabut all three variables show some explanatory power.
The corresponding tables for home loans and buy-to-let
loans examined separately are shown in the supplemen-
tary tables in the unpublished appendix (Connor and
Flavin, 2014).
The results in Table 6a are particularly interesting. For
purposes of informal analysis the three columns in the
table can be thought of as affordable payment, stressed
payment, and unaffordable payment; the three rows can
be thought of as positive equity, zero to moderate negative
equity, and large negative equity. Note that the ð1;1Þ sub-
set (affordable payment, positive equity) has an average
default rate of 43.4% whereas the ð3;3Þ subset (unafford-
able payment, large negative equity) has a default rate of
70.6%. The ð3;1Þ and ð1;3Þ subsets have roughly equal
average default rates which are not that much higher than
for the ð1;1Þ subset. The big jump in the default rate comes
when the loan has both low affordability and large negative
equity: the joint effect seems much bigger than the sum of
the two individual effects. This conforms to Foote’s (2008)
dual-trigger model of default, and supports the US-based
findings of Bhutta et al. (2010) and Elul et al. (2010). The
probit model which we use below also captures this empir-
ical feature.
Table 7 follows on from Table 6a. We subdivide the
loans into those that have undergone a decrease in afford-
ability since loan origination (for example due to unem-
ployment, lower household income, or higher short-term
debt obligations) and those that have undergone an
increase, and look at the default rates for the three levels
of current loan-to-value, using the interquartile range for
the middle loan-to-value category, as in Table 6. Both
decreased affordability and the current loan-to-value ratio
have an impact on default rates, and the two effects
interact, as in Table 6.ult as a function of loan-to-value.
Fig. 5a. Semiparametric estimation of the probability of default as a function of loan-to-value, all loans.
Fig. 5b. Semiparametric estimation of the probability of default as a function of loan-to-value, home loans.
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bit model with all six explanatory variables3:
ProbðdefaultiÞ ¼ Uðb0 þ b1LTVi þ b2Affordi
þ b3LogIncomei þ b4AppLTVi
þ b5AppAffordi þ b6AppLogIncomeiÞ:
The results are shown in Table 8, for all loans in the data-
base, and then for the subsample of home loans and buy-
to-let loans estimated separately.
Application-date affordability and application-date log
income have weak explanatory power in Table 8. In Table 93 For robustness, we estimate this model on the full sample and two
subsamples (home loans and buy-to-let loans) using three methods (probit,
logit, and linear-probability ordinary least squares) and show estimation
results for each in an unpublished appendix. The results are quite uniform
across the three subsamples and three estimation techniques.we re-estimate the probit models dropping these two vari-
ables. In Table 10 we show estimates of this same model
using the logistic distribution in place of the normal distri-
bution. We will focus on the probit model with four
explanatory variables (Table 9).
The last two columns in Table 9 show the marginal
impact on default probability of a marginal change in each
explanatory variable, calculated two ways: using the sam-
ple average of the other explanatory variables, and com-
puted individually at each sample point and then
averaged across the sample. Both measures are used in
the literature but the latter is generally considered prefer-
able; see Greene (2008). Current log income has more
impact on the default decision than the current affordabil-
ity index. A strong and surprising finding is the notable
power of current loan-to-value in determining Irish mort-
gage default decisions, as measured by these marginal
Fig. 5c. Semiparametric estimation of the probability of default as a function of loan-to-value, buy-to-let loans.
Fig. 6a. Linear and semiparametric estimates of the contribution of loan-to-value to the default decision index, all loans.
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ther increased by the fact that current loan-to-value has a
wider interquartile range than the affordability index and
log income.
A key topic in the existing US research literature is mea-
suring the proportion of mortgage defaulters which are
unaffordability (inability to pay) versus strategic defaults.
The current loan-to-value ratio is the key variate in a stra-
tegic defaulter’s decision calculus, whereas loan-to-value
has little or no role in a unaffordability-based defaulter’s
decision calculus. The high explanatory power of current
loan-to-value is evidence of strategic decision-making
playing at least a partial role (explicitly or subconsciously)
by Irish mortgage defaulters. The evidence indicates thatIrish mortgage defaulters in our sample have mixed
motives, influenced simultaneously by stressed affordabil-
ity and strategic motives. Any ‘‘pure’’ strategic defaulters,
with no affordability pressure, are more likely to be in
the 30% or so of non-cooperating mortgage defaulters,
who do not submit an SFS and are not in our sample.
Note that application loan-to-value and current loan-
to-value have opposite-signed coefficients, negative and
positive respectively, reflecting the importance of property
price declines in explaining loan defaults (recall from the
discussion above that the difference between these two
variables mostly reflects underlying property capital gain
or loss). The opposite-signed coefficients on these two vari-
ables is indicative of strategic rather than income-driven
Fig. 6b. Linear and semiparametric estimates of the contribution of loan-to-value to the default decision index, home loans.
Fig. 6c. Linear and semiparametric estimates of the contribution of loan-to-value to the default decision index, buy-to-let loans.
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impacted by the underlying property’s price decline,
whereas strategic default depends crucially upon it.
Lastly, we use nonparametric and semiparametric
methods to examine potential nonlinearity in the response
of default to loan-to-value. We use the Gaussian kernel
throughout and set the bandwidth h using Silverman’s rule
of thumb, h ¼ ð4r2d3n Þ
1
5
,where r2d is the sample variance of
observed defaults and n is the number of observations in
the sample or subsample. We estimate over the range0 < LTV < 3 but note with caution that kernel methods
are unreliable in the tails of the data range. The 99% middle
range of the data, leaving 0.5% in each tail of the sample, is
(.06,2.62) for all loans, (.02,2.28) for home loans, and
(.17,3.07) for buy-to-let loans. Nonparametric or semipara-
metric estimates outside this middle range are
untrustworthy.
Fig. 4 shows unconditional expected default as a non-
parametric function of loan-to-value using kernel-based
nonparametric regression; see Eq. (5) in Section 3.2. The
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increases for all categories. It is also notable that the rate
of increase is greater for higher levels of LTV. Fig. 5 takes
the nonparametrically-estimated expected defaults from
Fig. 4 and compares them to the conditional expected
defaults from the probit model in Table 9; see Eqs. (3)
and (5) in Section 3.2. There is evidence for the type of non-
linearity predicted by options theory in Figs. 4 and 5, with
the response curves flattening for LTV< 1 and curving
upward at high LTV. The convex nonlinearity, as reflected
in a nonzero linear model bias, seems to start at a
loan-to-value ratio of 1.5 for home loans. For buy-to-let
mortgages, the convex nonlinearity starts earlier, near a
loan-to-value ratio of 1.0. This suggests that own-home
occupiers are more reluctant to strategically default than
investors with buy-to-let properties. Fig. 6 shows the non-
linear LTV response functions estimated by the partially
linear index probit model (see Eq. (7) in Section 3.2). The
results are suggestive, but not definitive, regarding a
convex nonlinearity in the link between loan-to-value
and loan default; see Elul et al. (2010) for related evidence
for the US market using different estimation methods
(step-wise linearity over intervals in a logit model). The
coefficient estimates for the other five variables (for
which the linearity assumption is maintained) are shown
in the supplementary tables in the unpublished appendix
(Connor and Flavin, 2014).5. Conclusion
This paper empirically examines the causes of mortgage
default using a unique dataset of troubled Irish mortgages.
We differentiate between strategic default, default caused
by unaffordability, and dual-trigger default in which stra-
tegic and unaffordability effects combine. Irish mortgage
data holds considerable interest for studying mortgage
default behavior due to the unusual economic and institu-
tional environment of Ireland during our sample period.
Following its credit crisis in 2008, Ireland suffered one of
the sharpest nationwide property price falls ever recorded:
the national residential property price index declined
50.3% from its 2007 peak to its 2012 trough. In July 2009,
the Irish government placed an effective 4-year block on
all property repossessions, and 7 months later the Irish
Central Bank Ireland implemented very strict regulations
on bank communication with delinquent borrowers (these
regulations were rescinded in July 2013). During this per-
iod, Ireland experienced fast-growing and extremely high
mortgage default rates: owner-occupier mortgage defaults
grew by 273% in a 4 year period; in the second quarter of
2013, 12.7% of owner-occupier mortgages had greater than
90 days of arrears, as did 20.4% of buy-to-let mortgages.
Our empirical analysis supports the dual-trigger model
of default: both strategic and unaffordability variates play
a significant role in explaining Irish default rates; Irish
mortgage borrowers are most likely to default when stra-
tegic and unaffordability factors combine.
The consensus view from US-based research is that both
unaffordability and strategic motives affect default rates,
but unaffordability is the more important motive. In ourIrish sample, the relative strength of these effects is
reversed, with the strategic motive a more powerful uni-
variate predictor of default than lack of affordability.
Appendix A. Technical Appendix
This technical appendix contains background material
on the nonparametric regression estimation procedure
presented in Section 3.2. First we assume that the default
decision index is fully nonparametric:
v i ¼ f ðxiÞ þ ei
and wish to estimate the univariate nonparametric rela-
tionship between x1i and expected default. Define gðx1iÞ
as conditional expected default:
gðx1iÞ ¼ E½dijx1i ¼ E½ff ðxiÞ þ eigþjx1i
where fgþ equals one if the argument is positive and
otherwise zero. In order to implement nonparametric ker-
nel regression, we assume that gðÞ is thrice continuously
differentiable. This imposes implicit assumptions on the
smoothness of f ðÞ and on D, the multivariate distribution
of x; we take this assumption as primitive, noting in pass-
ing that there are many explicit special cases of f ðÞ and D
which would justify the assumption. Let ni denote the
mean-zero deviation of realized default from conditional
mean default:
di ¼ gðx1iÞ þ ni
where we assume that the density function of x1i is thrice
continuously differential and that ni has uniformly
bounded conditional variance r2nðx1iÞ. Using the Gaussian
kernel together with bandwidth h ¼ cn15 to estimatebgðx1iÞ by (5), we have by Theorem 2.2 in Li and Racine
(2007):
d lim
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
nh
p
ðbgðx1iÞ  gðx1iÞ  bðx1iÞÞ  N 0; r2n ðx1iÞdensðx1iÞ
 !
where bðx1iÞ is a standard bias correction term; see Li and
Racine, page 62.
In the restricted case, we first estimate ðb0; bÞ under the
assumption that the multivariate probit holds, and then
nonparametrically estimate bgðx1iÞ using (6) applied to the
predicted default rates from the estimated probit model.
We ignore the estimation error in ðbb0; bbÞ since it converges
to zero at a faster rate than bgðx1iÞ  gðx1iÞ. The same Theo-
rem 2.2 from Li and Racine applies in this case.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jhe.2014.12.003.
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